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Background
• Infrastructure: high proportion of cost are sunk,
equivalently much investment is irreversible
• Future infrastructure costs are uncertain
• Future demand/surplus (welfare) is uncertain
• Modern regulation seeks to facilitate competition
Regulation and the incumbent
• Regulation seeks to induce
– The right timing (quantity of investment)
• Reasonable Regulation seeks :
- Financial viability i.e.
expected net return from investment should not be negative
- Lowest cost provision: rate base
- Replacement cost or
- Historical cost
• Incumbent firm may under regulation
- A Choose the timing of investment, or
- B Have its timing constrained (universal service)
Regulation A: firm is free to choose
investment timing
• Applicable to an extent in all regulation: asymmetric
information, eg maintenance
• In the environment of
– Uncertainty about future total consumer and producer benefits
– Uncertainty about future network costs
– Irreversible investment
– The regulator selecting historical or replacement cost rate base
– An incumbent with no competition
we reach the following conclusions
Regulation A: firm free to choose
• Generally the regulator seeks earlier investment
• Variation in demand and cost really matter with irreversible
investment
• Whether replacement cost or historical cost is desirable depends
on the industry
– Little variation in costs suggests preference for replacement cost
– Much variation in cost, and cost declines associated with increased
consumer benefits, suggest preference for historical cost
• The appropriate allowed rate of return is higher with replacement
(vs. historical) cost regulation: higher than standard WACC
• Setting the allowed rate of return too low leads to very substantial
reductions in consumer benefits as compared to setting it too high
Regulation B: firm forced to supply
• The firm has no options: must supply
• Future demand is uncertain (uncertain cost will also
matter)
• Regulation
– Seeks financial viability & lowest cost
– May be Rate-of-Return or Incentive Regulation
• First case: reversible investment
Second case: irreversibility
How much “profit” is “reasonable”?
Required to supply: reversible
C1 “Traditional” regulation: revenue based on
historical cost
Revenue Requirement = rate of return times cost at the
        beginning of the period
00000010 )1(][ SrPSPSPrRE =-+=
How much “profit” is “reasonable”?
Required to supply: reversible
C2 “Incentive” regulation: revenue based on
replacement cost
Revenue Requirement = rate of return times cost at the
        beginning of the period, 
        adjusted for expected capital
        gain or loss over the period
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Irreversibility
Required to supply
• Capacity
- Can never fall
- Expands when required to meet demand
• Leads to stranding possibilities
• Distinguish between capacity and demand (number
of subscribers): 
i.e. Capacity (S) at least as large as Demand (X)
Adjusting the capacity of the regulated
network under irreversibility when demand
must be served
Capacity
Demand
Time
• Typical volatility in “demand”: growth rates
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
Average: 1.5%, variation (std. dev.): 6.1%
• Electricity distribution networks (volume)
  Average: 2.0%, variation (std. dev.): 4.5%
Demand volatility
C3 Revenue Requirement
Revenue Requirement is:
a) Historical cost times the risk adjusted rate, plus
b) Adjustment for expected capital gains/losses
resulting from price and/or demand reductions
Reasonable return when costs are sunk
required to supply
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Reasonable regulation when costs are sunk
incentive regulation when required to supply (C3, again)
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• Depend upon view of the future
• “Reasonable” allowed rate of return depends on
- Systematic risk (in profit, replacement cost, demand)
- Uncertainty in technology and prices
- Uncertainty in demand
• Lowest cost of “what” ?(present & future customers ?)
• Allowed rate of return on “what”? (rate base?)
Reasonable regulation when costs are sunk
incentive regulation when required to supply (C3, yet again)
• For historical cost ratebase
Allowed rate of return
may be much above r
• Form of regulation/rate of return/reset period must
be jointly determined
• Value of the incumbent may be greater than  
optimised replacement cost
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Asset Stranding Potentiality: summary
• Traditional regulation
- Customers absorb the risk, firm does not
- Prices vary over time
- Reasonable return may be as low as risk-free rate
• Incentive regulation
- Firm absorbs the risk
- Prices constant over time
- Reasonable return exceeds risk-free rate
• Social ranking
- Incentive regulation preferred to Traditional regulation
Reasonable rates of return
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•   Risk-free rate is 5%
•   No systematic risk
* i.e. tilted annuity adds 2%
Examples
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
- Average growth rate: 1.5%,Std dev growth rate: 6.1%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 50 basis point
premium
• Electricity distribution networks (volume)
- Average growth rate: 2.0%, Std dev growth rate: 4.5%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 24 basis point
premium
• Mixture of technologies
1. Flexible, but expensive
2. Inflexible, but cheap
• E.g. mobile generation and maintenance
• Technology mix can be used to manage future
demand risk
Regulation and Competing
Technologies
Adjusting network composition
over time
Threshold for
investing in fixed
network
Capacity of fixed
network
Demand
Reversible Investment
Time
Regulation effects: technology mix
• Traditional regulation
- Either
- All flexible technology
- Or all inflexible technology
• Incentive regulation
- Optimal mix of two technologies
• Information requirements for regulation
– Lower for incentive regulation
Summary: when firm must supply
• Traditional regulation:
̶Inefficient risk allocation
̶Inefficient investment mix
̶Low required rate of return
• Incentive regulation
̶Efficient risk allocation
̶Efficient investment mix
̶Higher required rate of return
Conclusion: sunk investment affects the
cost of capital
• Where the firm is free to choose the allowed return is asymmetric in
its effects: too low is costly
• Rate-base, allowed return, reset periods interact and should be
determined jointly
• Uncertainty and variation matters: specific risks importantly affect
systematic risk, raise allowed rates of return under reasonable
regulation.
• Reasonable regulation does not imply the value of the firm is its
optimised replacement cost
• The standard WACC is but an element of the investment decision:
relevant risks should be recognised in the calculation of the allowed
rate of return (and the WACC).
